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Abstract 
 
The long pre-crisis period of growth and employment creation in Spain was 
based mainly on the construction sector. This, facilitated by cheap bank loans 
created jobs for the millions of immigrants arriving in the country. The crisis 
made the Spanish economy sink into a deep recession in 2008. The aim of this 
article  is  to  describe  the  Spanish  crisis-management  in  the  past  years.  The 
extremely high unemployment rate and the indebtedness made policy-makers to 
adopt austerity  measures and  realise the necessity of  profound  reforms.  The 
biggest transformation processes began among the savings banks and on the 
labour market. The article concludes that these reforms should continue while it 
is necessary to find a new model for long-term growth. Endowments like the 
excellent  infrastructure  and  successful  companies,  stronger  export  activity, 
international presence and innovation can provide the bases for such a durable 
growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Spain was hit hard by the international financial and economic crisis. The 
period from 2008-2011 is characterised by recession, high unemployment rate 
and stagnation. Meanwhile the sovereign debt crisis of other periphery Eurozone 
member  states  erupted  and  deepened.  As  a  consequence,  the  confidence  of 
international  financial  market  investors  in  the  Spanish  economy  has  been 
shaken. From one side, the Spanish government has been kept under pressure to 
implement measures aiming to restore credibility. From the other side, it has had 
to respond to internal pressure against the reform steps. The situation is difficult 
and does not promise a rapid exit from the crisis.   
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The paper is organised as follows. The first section describes the long 
period of economic boom and the effects of the international crisis that followed 
upon it. The second section shows the measures taken by the government to 
mitigate the effects of crisis and the efforts to implement reforms. The third 
section analyses the possibilities for recovery and the potential for finding new 
bases of growth. 
 
2. The road to the crisis 
From  the  second  half  of  the  nineties  until  2007,  Spain  experienced  a 
spectacular period of economic growth. By the end of the period, Spain‟s GDP 
per  capita  had  reached  90%  of  the  EU-15  average.  The  recession  in  the 
beginning  of  the  nineties  caused  high  public  deficits,  but  afterwards  they 
decreased and a surplus was even achieved between 2005 and 2007. Figure 1 
illustrates some of the main macroeconomic indicators of the Spanish economy 
from 1998 to 2010. 
 
Figure 1. Macroeconomic indicators of Spain, 1998-2010 (per cent) 
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Source: Eurostat and Ministry of Economy for 2010 
 
The  traditionally  high  unemployment  rate  decreased  continuously  to 
below ten percent during the period of the “Golden Decade” (EEAG, 2011).  
This decrease is even more remarkable if we take into consideration that, during 
the  last  decade,  Spain  has  experienced  a  massive  inflow  of  foreigners.  The 
number  of  immigrants  has  increased  five  times:  5.7  million  foreigners  were  THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN   43 
 
 
living  in  Spain  in  2010,  approximately  12.2  percent  of  the  population
1.  The 
labour market was easily able to absorb these people. The weight of immigrants 
in  employment  increased  from  1  to  14.8%  between  2000  and  2008  (￉ltető, 
2011). Foreigners took on approximately half of the vacant jobs created during 
this period. They found jobs in services, tourism, agriculture, households and 
first of all in the construction industry.  
The  data  provided  above  illustrate  that  Spanish  growth  was  labour 
intensive  and  has  relied mostly  on  services  and the  construction  sector. The 
weight of the latter in the economy has increased significantly. Several “mega-
investment projects” were undertaken and houses were built in huge numbers. 
(Two thirds of the housing units built in Europe between 1999 and 2007 were 
built in Spain)
2. In 2003 the government liberalised the use of constructible land 
and  the  value  of  land  increased  drastically  afterwards  (Garriga,  2010).  As  a 
consequence, housing prices tripled in nominal terms and doubled in real terms 
between 1995-2008
3. The well-known “construction bubble” developed. A large 
number of hotels and apartment houses were built along the coastline sometimes 
on green areas or by corrupting local politicians
4. The construction boom was 
aided  by  bank  loans.  By  the  end  of  2008,  the  stock  of  loans  to  real  estate 
developers and builders reached the equivalent to 50% of Spain‟s GDP (Cuðat 
and Garicano, 2010).  Loans to buy own houses became cheap, because after 
Spain  joined  the  EMU  and  introduced  the  euro  interest  rates  declined 
significantly.
5 Thus indebtedness of the population increased.  
Despite extensive growth, productivity did not rise in Spain. Based on the 
evolution of unit labour costs the country lost competitiveness with respect to 
the EU and OECD countries (see Figure 2). This phenomenon became most 
pronounced in 2003. (As a consequence of the crisis unit labour costs increased 
only slightly in 2009.) 
Another important feature of the pre-crisis decade in Spain is the drastic 
deterioration of the current account balance. The deficit was 3.3 percent of GDP 
in 2002. But in 2007 it reached 10 percent, a level never before seen in Spain 
(see Figure 1). This deterioration was caused by three groups of factors (Alonso, 
2010). First, as Table 1 shows, the trade deficit tripled during the examined 
growth period because internal demand increased significantly for imports, and 
exports could not compensate for these at all. Second, those factors that used to 
compensate the trade deficit likewise deteriorated.  
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Figure 2. Annual growth of Unit Labour Costs, % 
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
7,0
8,0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Spain  OECD Europe OECD 
 
Source: OECD (aggregate data for 2009 not yet available) 
The  balance  of  current  transfers  turned  to  a  deficit  (immigrant 
remittances played an important role here) and the deficit of the income balance 
increased  significantly.  Third,  the  price  competitiveness  of  the  economy 
deteriorated as a consequence of the inflation difference compared to its trading 
partners (the OECD countries). This compeled several exporting companies to 
decrease  export  prices  or  export  activity  which  had  an  effect  on  the  trade 
balance. 
 
Table  1.  Development  of  the  current  account  balance  in  Spain  (billion 
Euros) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Trade 
balance  
28,5  35,6  -36,4  -37,4  -39,8  -53,7  -68,6  -80,1  -91,2  -86,7 
Services  21,5  24,2  27,1  26,1  23,3  21,8  22,2  22,1  23,1  26,1 
  Tourism  25,2  27,7  29,9  28,5  27,0  26,6  26,4  27,4  27,7  28,1 
  Other   
services 
-3,7  -3,5  -2,8  -2,4  -3,7  -4,9  -4,2  -5,3  -4,6  -1,9 
Income  -8,9  -9,1  -10,8  -10,4  -11,6  -12,1  -17,1  -21,0  -30,1  -36,0 
  of work  0  -0,06  -0,02  0,007  0,1  -0,1  -0,2  -0,3  -0,3  -0,1 
  of 
investment 
-8,9  -8,9  -10,8  -10,4  -11,7  -12,0  -16,9  -20,7  -29,9  -36,0 
Current 
transfers 
2,8  1,5  1,8  2,4  0,2  -0,1  -3,4  -5,8  -7,1  -9,4 
Current 
account 
balance 
-13,1  -18,9  -18,3  -16,6  -27,9  -44,2  -66,9  -84,7  -105,4  -106,0 
Source: Banco de Espaða 
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The international financial crisis put an end to the “Golden Decade” in 
Spain.  Between  2008  and  2010,  macroeconomic  indicators  worsened 
considerably (see Figure 1). Previously positive tendencies were reversed. The 
“bubble”  burst  and  the  construction  sector  had  to  be  restructured.  Credit 
conditions hardened. Unemployment again jumped to extremely high levels (to 
20%). Lots of young people lost their jobs (youth unemployment rate was 41.6% 
in 2010, by far the highest in Europe
6) among them lots of immigrants. The data 
published in April 2011 were even worse, with a general unemployment rate of 
21.3% and 45% among young people under 25 years of age. 
The effects of the crisis on the Spanish commercial banking system were 
less drastic than in other countries
7. Subprime credits were not popular and the 
reserve rates demanded by the Bank of Spain were high. The stability of the 
large Spanish banks was demonstrated in July 2010 when (based on a Spanish 
initiative) European bank stress tests were published. The situation was worse in 
the case of the savings banks (cajas), which are regionally based institutions with 
more branches and employees than commercial banks. Cajas are in most cases 
controlled by regional politicians and had financed local real-estate businesses in 
the past. They were exposed to the effects of the crisis to different extents, their 
share of non-performing loans varied between 1 and 7% (Cuðat and Garicano, 
2010).  Caja  Castilla-La  Mancha  had  the  largest  liquidity  problem  and  its 
direction was finally taken over by the Bank of Spain in March 2009. 
Public debt in Spain increased between 2008 and 2010 from 39.8% of the 
GDP to 60.1%. This is not too high compared to some other EU countries but, 
according  to  forecasts,  it  will  rise  further.  The  sovereign  debt  crisis  of  the 
Eurozone also affected the Spanish economy, thus financing this debt on the 
international market became increasingly difficult.  
  
3. The crisis management of the government 
The first reaction of the Spanish government to the financial crisis was 
similar to that in other countries: mitigation of the damaging effects. At the 
beginning  of  the  crisis,  Spanish  public  finances  were  remarkably  sound. 
Therefore,  resources  were  available  with  which  to  apply  fiscal  stimulating 
measures. The problem was the great extent of this stimulus, which rose to as 
much as 9% of GDP during 2008-9 (the highest share in the EU). This resulted 
from a 6% rise in public expenditure and from a 3% decline in tax revenue 
relative to GDP (Serrano, 2010). As a consequence, the budget deficit increased 
dramatically to 4.2% of GDP in 2008 and to 11% in 2009.  
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Table  2.  Main  stimulating  and  restrictive  measures  of  the  Spanish 
government 
Stimulating measures 
2008-2009 
Restrictive and revenue increasing measures  
2010 
Families  Tax  reductions  and 
allowances,  increase 
of minimum pension, 
etc.  Total  14  billion 
Euros 
VAT  General  rate  increase  from  16 
to18 and preferential rate from 7 
to 8 since July 2010 
Companies  Allowances  and  new 
credit possibilities for 
SMEs,  31  billion 
Euros 
Tax  From  January  2011  no  „baby-
cheque” (2500 Euros at birth). 
 
Employment  Special  funds  to 
create  local  jobs,  11 
billion Euros 
Infrastructure  State  infrastructure  expenditures 
decreased by 6 billion Euros until 
2012 
 
Financial system  Raising  capital  of 
Deposit  Guarantee 
Fund,  establishing 
Financial  Assets 
Acquisition  Fund
8  to 
support  bank  lending 
of  non  financial 
companies  and 
individuals. 
Wages  5% decrease in wages for public 
employees in 2010 and freeze for 
2011.  Wage  cut  for  government 
members is 15% 
Automotive 
industry 
Integrated plan for the 
Car  Industry  for 
demand  stimulation 
and  investment,  4 
billion Euros 
Pension  Indexation of pensions abolished 
for 2011. Raise of retirement age 
from 65 to 67 
 
Economic 
modernisation 
Reform  of  energy, 
telecom, transport and 
service sector 
Privatisation  Speeding  up  partial  privatisation 
of  Aena  (airport  managing 
company)  and  state  lottery 
system 
 
The  accumulation  of  a  huge  budget  deficit  forced  the  government  to 
change its fiscal policy in 2010. The effects of the Greek crisis contributed to 
this. International financial markets lost confidence in Spain, as well as in other 
countries on the periphery. Since then, the main aim of the Spanish government 
has  been to  defend  the  credibility  of its  stability  plan  and reduce its  budget 
deficit gradually but firmly to 6% of GDP in 2011 and to 3% by 2013. In order 
to achieve this goal, austerity packages were announced and implemented. Table 
2  shows the  major  measures concerning  wages,  pension,  tax  changes. These 
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restrictions and the labour market reform led to a general strike in September 
2010, in spite of which the Spanish government firmly continued its policy. 
As mentioned, the situation of Spanish savings banks became difficult in 
the  crisis.  For  the  restructuring  of  the  cajas  and  banks,  the  government 
established  the  Bank-Restructuring  Fund  in  2009  (FROB,  Fondo  de 
Reestructuraciñn Ordenada Bancaria) with a capital of 9 billion Euros.  FROB 
manages the mergers of the cajas (from 45 cajas, 17 remained in 2010) and has 
the capacity to enhance the equity of credit institutions
9.  
2010 was the year of merger agreements between savings banks, in the 
most extensive banking concentration process ever undertaken in Spain. Mergers 
and  Institutional  Protection  Schemes  (IPS)  are  two  alternatives  available  to 
savings banks to concentrate their business and restructure. IPS is not a full 
merger, the individual cajas will remain distinct. It is a risk pooling measure to 
provide greater security to banks.
10 (The corporate government form of IPSs are 
often  criticised  to  be  complicated,  not  professional  and  not  transparent,  see 
Cuðat and Garicano, 2010.) 
The  Royal  Decree  2/2011  increases  the  core  capital  requirements  of 
savings  banks  by  September 2011, otherwise FROB  will  seize control.  Core 
capital should be raised generally to 8% of risk-weighted assets but to 10% for 
those who depend on wholesale capital markets for more than a fifth of their 
funding or if less than a fifth of their shares are in private hands. 
Another important area where urgent and deep reforms were necessary is 
the labour market. It is a peculiar feature of the Spanish economy that, in times 
of  crisis,  unemployment  jumps  to  extraordinary  high  levels.  This  happened 
again, since 2009 unemployment rate remains around 20%, being the highest in 
the EU. This is explained partly by the collapse of the previously job-creating 
construction sector but also by the special characteristics of the Spanish labour 
market. 
One main important feature of the labour market is duality. This means 
that there are two “levels” of working force: temporary and permanent workers. 
The use of temporary, fixed- term contracts was liberalised in the labour reform 
of 1984 and quickly became very popular. Since the end of the eighties until 
2008 more than 30% of the labour force worked with temporary contracts (see 
Figure 3). This is a very high level, double of the EU-average. As a consequence 
of the crisis, the share of workers with fixed-term contracts decreased, because 
                                                           
9 Nota sobre el proceso de reestructuraciñn y saneamiento de las cajas de ahorros. Situaciñn en 
marzo de 2011. Banco de Espaňa, 23. Marzo 2011 http://www.bde.es. 
10An IPS group has a legally -binding cross-guarantee mechanism for solvency and liquidity 
support ensuring that the cons olidated equity and liquidity of the entire group is available to 
protect the creditors of each and every member of the group sharing the scheme. 
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they were the easiest to send off (severance payments are 8 days per year of 
service).  
 
Figure  3.  Employees  with  temporary  contract,  %  of  total  number  of 
employees 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
Workers with permanent contracts are difficult to lay off, their dismissal 
is very costly because of high severance payments. These severance payments 
depend on whether the dismissal is considered fair or unfair, but because in 
Spain the interpretation of fair dismissal is very restrictive, firms rather prefer to 
pay the higher severance payments than going through a trial (Jaumotte, 2011, 
Banco de Espaða, 2009).  Severance payments for unfair dismissal vary between 
33 and 45 days per year of service (the EU-average is 21 days).  Permanent 
workers,  usually  older  people,  who  are  not  interested  in  giving  up  their 
privileges  are  well  protected,  while  temporary  workers  are  primarily  young 
people  and  women.  The  conflict  between  “insiders  and  outsiders”  has  not 
decreased in spite of the several attempts to reform the labour market (Dolado et 
al., 2010, Conde Ruiz, et al., 2010). This time, however, the serious recession 
made the Spanish government to prepare a bolder labour reform plan. 
 The first phase was implemented in 2010. Among other measures, the 
use of the contract with 33 days severance payment per year for unfair dismissal 
was generalized, the criteria for fair dismissal were eased, the termination costs 
for temporary contracts are to be raised gradually. Part (8 days) of severance  THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN   49 
 
 
payments can be financed by a Wage Guarantee Fund paid by firms. In the 
second  phase  of  the  reform,  from  January  2012  this  Fund  will  turn  into  an 
individual capitalisation fund for each employee. Workers will be able to draw 
money from this fund in case of dismissal, geographical mobility, training or 
retirement. Although this labour reform is an important step, analysts point out 
that it is incomplete, further reforms and clarifications are necessary and the 
effectiveness of the measures depend on the practice (Jaumotte, 2011, EEAG, 
2011, Mora-Sanguinetti and Wölfl, 2011, Conde Ruiz et al, 2011). 
Another main feature of the Spanish labour market is the institutional 
setting of collective bargaining at an intermediate level. The coordination of 
wage bargaining is regulated in the Workers‟ Statute Law of 1980. It takes place 
primarily at the regional or industry level and sometimes at the company level. 
Wage  agreements  are  automatically  extended to  all  firms  of the  province  or 
sector even if they did not participate in the bargaining. Until 2010 it was very 
difficult for firms to opt out from collective agreements, but the new reform 
eased this by simplifying the conditions. Wages are indexed and corrected on 
inflation (always upwards). All this led to the strange phenomenon that despite 
the  severe  contraction  of  the  economy,  decreasing  inflation  and  the  high 
unemployment rate, negotiated wages increased in 2008 and in 2009, both in 
nominal  and  in  real  terms  (Banco  de  Espaða,  2008).  Thus  the  collective 
bargaining system is heavily criticised for hindering the sectoral reallocation of 
employment, flexibility of wages and internal reorganisation of firms. In this 
way, it also makes the exit from the crisis and developing competitiveness more 
difficult (FEDEA, 2011). 
It also contributes to the high unemployment rate in Spain that internal 
mobility  of  the  labour  force  is  traditionally  low.  There  is  no,  or  very  slow 
reallocation of workers from high – to low-unepmloyment regions; therefore 
regional  differences  regarding  unemployment  are  high  (Bande  et  al.,  2008, 
Mora-Sanguinetti and Wölfl, 2011).  
Apart from the labour market, Spanish government launched reforms in 
other  areas like the pension  system,  public  administration.  All these reforms 
mean the beginning of a hard road to take that leads to a profound restructuring 
of the economy. 
 
4. Searching for a new model 
The crisis undermined the previous model of economic growth in Spain. 
A  new  model  of  sustainable  growth  is  needed  together  with  an  increase  in 
productivity. In order to achieve this, profound structural reforms are necessary 
in several areas. As we have seen, the reform of the labour market, pension 
system and banking sector has already begun. A lot should be done however to 
remodel  the  education  system.  This  is  essential  for  developing  a  qualified 
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The problems of the Spanish education system are many. One principal 
and sad feature is early school-leaving. Spain ranks among the leaders in this 
respect  in  the  EU:  33%  of  18-24  year-olds  left  school  with  few  or  no 
qualifications and were no longer in education in 2009. The EU-average was 14, 
4%. The early school-leaving rate is similar to the Spanish one (above 30%) in 
Portugal and Malta too, but a significant decrease has been observed there since 
the year 2000. During the same period, the share of early school-leavers even 
increased  by  7%  in  Spain  (European  Commission,  2011).  The  construction 
boom led many young people to leave education for work in this sector. Now 
that the real estate bubble has burst, they find themselves without work and 
dependent on welfare benefits. 
The large number of early school leavers keeps the cost of education high 
for the state. Educational expenditure was 4.3% of GDP in 2007, similar to the 
German figure (4.5%)
11. University education is popular in Spain, costs are not 
high for students. A shortage of skilled-labour, however, has developed over the 
past  decade.  Spain  generally  does  not  rank  high  regarding  indicators  of 
education. The country traditionally lags in PISA tests, and, in 2009, was again 
significantly below the OECD average in all respects.
12 The youth educational 
attainment level (the share of those who have at least secondary level education) 
was 59.9% in 2009 among 20-24 year olds, much lower than the EU-average.
13 
No Spanish university can be found among the first 200 universities of world-
ranking lists. 
Innovation could be another basis for long-term growth, but Spain stays 
behind in several measures of innovative activities too. Expenditures on R&D 
are  constantly  growing  (from  0.94%  to  1.35%  of  GDP  between  2000  and 
2008
14), but the aim was to reach 2%. In 2008 the government established a 
Ministry of Science and Innovation, separating the field from the Ministry of 
Education. Apart from this, promotion measures have been introduced, such as 
an increase in the corporate tax allowance for R&D activities. Although small 
and medium sized enterprises account for more than 80% of private employment 
in  Spain,  their  research  and  development  efforts  are  weak  (Ahedo,  2010). 
Corporate R&D activities are concentrated in a group of large enterprises.  
The problem is that it takes considerable time and financial support for the 
reform process in these fields (education, innovation, the labour market) to take 
hold  and  thereby  support  a  new  durable  growth  model.  In  the  short  run, 
however, state expenditures have been reduced because Spain is still obliged to 
                                                           
11Source: Eurostat. 
12PISA 2009 Rankings: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/12/46643496.pdf. 
13EU-27 average was 78,6%, the data for the Czech Republic was 91,9%, for Hungary 84%, for 
France 83,6% according to Eurostat. 
14 Indicadores del Sistema Espaðol de Ciencia y Tecnolog￭a 2008. Publicaciñn 2010. Fundaciñn 
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manage the effects of the crisis; above all, to finance its debt and reduce its 
budget deficit. Domestic demand and growth prospects are weak and therefore, 
state  revenues  are  not  likely  to  increase.  Thus,  further  expenditure  cuts  and 
austerity measures may be necessary in order to achieve financial stability goals. 
This will further hinder growth. The question is whether there is an immediate 
way out of this vicious circle. 
 
Table 3. Geographical composition of Spanish exports, selected areas, % 
  2000  2007  2010  2010/2000 
EU  73,37  70,73  67,69  1,38 
Eurozone  60,45  57,07  55,61  1,38 
France  19,43  18,80  18,28  1,41 
Germany  12,34  10,75  10,47  1,27 
Italy  8,74  8,90  8,77  1,50 
Portugal  9,55  8,65  8,92  1,40 
Rest of Europe  4,82  6,42  6,89  2,14 
Switzerland  0,97  1,31  1,84  2,84 
Turkey  1,70  1,59  2,02  1,77 
Russia  0,47  1,13  1,07  3,45 
North America  5,34  4,43  4,00  1,12 
USA  4,87  4,02  3,51  1,08 
Latin-America  5,66  4,85  5,38  1,42 
Mexico  1,22  1,72  1,51  1,86 
Brazil  1,01  0,70  1,15  1,70 
Asia  5,83  6,12  7,51  1,93 
China  0,45  1,15  1,43  4,78 
Africa  3,32  4,35  5,61  2,53 
Morocco  1,10  1,66  1,86  2,52 
Algeria  0,44  0,73  1,10  3,72 
Total export  100  100  100  1,50 
Source:  calculations  from  the  data  of  Ministry  of  Industry,  Tourism  and 
Commerce 
A  possible  solution  might  be  to  increase  exports  significantly.  In  this 
respect, it is important to observe the product and geographical composition of 
exports. The main exported products of Spain are cars (usually around 20% of 
total  exports),  chemicals,  pharmaceuticals,  food,  textile  and  clothing.  The 
technological content of Spanish exports is low in international comparison (the 
share of high-tech products in manufacturing was 5% in 2008, while in Italy it 
was 7%, in France 20%, etc.)
15.  The bulk of the export is given by multinational 
companies,  mainly  in  the  automotive,  steel,  chemical  and  pharmaceutical 
sectors.  The  product  structure  is  vulnerable  to  international  conjunctural 
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changes, this could be seen during the recent crisis, too exports declined between 
2008 and 2009 and recuperated afterwards. However, Spain did not lose market 
shares in the world during the last five years despite the high unit labour costs 
(Figure 2) and loss of price-competitiveness.  
The majority of the Spanish exports are directed towards the EU, the main 
receiving countries are France, Germany, Italy and Portugal (see Table 3.). The 
share  of  the  non-EU  direction  is  relatively  low  (it  was  32.3%  in  2010)  but 
increased in the past years (it was 26.6% in 2000). It can be seen from the table 
that there are areas to where the exports increased much more vigorously in the 
past  decade than  the  average  Spanish  export  increase. These  are all  non-EU 
regions: the tendency is the most spectacular in the case of China, Russia and 
Algeria.  It  seems  thus,  that  there  are  possibilities  for  Spanish  exporters  that 
should be even more utilised outside the EU.  
Internationalization of the traditionally small and medium-sized Spanish 
firms has indeed increased over the past twenty years, but still a lot could be 
done.  Larger  Spanish  companies  became  successful  multinationals  (like 
Telefñnica, Repsol, Banco Santander, Inditex) but the image of Spanish trade-
marks could still be improved. Among the top global brands only one Spanish 
company, Zara, can be found
16, but because of the fact that the name sounds 
Italian, it is not clearly linked to Spain in the public opinion. Many Spanish 
companies  do  not  use  Spanish  names  and  therefore  their  success  is  not 
associated with the country (Chislett, 2010). In spite of that, due to the large 
companies, Spain could maintain its export shares in the world. A considerable 
group of Spanish firms have become competitive and they can be one important 
base of the future economic growth.  
Another important basic factor can be the well developed infrastructure. 
Spain is on the first position in Europe regarding motorway density and for 2010 
the country was already ahead of France and Japan regarding high-speed railway 
lines. Significant modernisation of airports and ports were realised in the past 
decade (FEDEA-McKinsey, 2010). The state of the infrastructure together with 
the  abundant  natural  resources  can  be  well  utilised  in  the  development  and 
quality improvement of tourism and services. 
Growth prospects on the short term are gloomy. In this respect, Spain is 
similar to those countries that, because of sovereign debt crisis, have asked for 
the rescue package of the European Union and the IMF. Table 4 shows some 
macroeconomic indices of the Southern peripheral country group. It can be seen 
that  Spain  has the  lowest  public debt  to  GDP  ratio  and the highest  level  of 
unemployment.  
 
                                                           
16  Zara  was  on  the  48th  place  among  the  100  top  brands  in  2010.  Source:  Interbrand, 
http://www.interbrand.com.  THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN   53 
 
 
Table 4. Selected macroeconomic data and forecasts 
  Portugal  Greece  Ireland  Spain 
  2010  2011  2010  2011  2010  2011  2010  2011 
Inflation*  1.4  2.4  4.7  2.5  -1.6  0.5  2.0  2.6 
Public 
deficit/GDP,% 
-9.1  -5.6  -9.6  -7.4  -32.2  -10.8  -9.3  -6.2 
Unemployment  11.0  12  12.6  14.5  13.7  14.0  20.1  20.8 
GDP growth  1,0  -2,0  -4.5  -3.0  -1.0  0.5  -0.1  0.8 
Public debt/GDP,%  93  98  142.8  150.0  96.2  111.0  60.1  67.3 
Current  account 
balance to GDP 
-9.9  -8.7  -10.4  -8.2  -0.7  0.2  -4.5  -4.8 
*Annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices 
Source: Eurostat, IMF and national forecasts 
 
Although the stagnation of Spain is similar to the one in other countries, 
the economic situation is different in each case. Each country has its own pre-
crisis history and distinct structural problems. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Spain experienced a long period of prosperity before the financial crisis. 
The growth and employment creation however, was based on such factors that 
did not prove to be durable. The main motor of the boom was the construction 
sector, which created jobs also for the millions of immigrants arriving in the 
country. This was facilitated by cheap loans mainly from the savings banks. The 
crisis put an end to this boom in 2008 and the Spanish economy sank into a deep 
recession.  
The  consequences  of  the  crisis,  first  of  all,  the  extremely  high 
unemployment  rate  and  the  indebtedness  made  policy-makers  realise  the 
necessity  of  profound  reforms.  The  biggest  transformation  processes  began 
among the savings banks and on the labour market. In the latter field, reforms 
aim  to  decrease  duality,  which  means  the  high  share  of  temporary  workers 
beside those with indefinite contracts. Because of wage rigidities stemming from 
the  collective  bargaining  system,  firms  react  to  difficulties  by  dismissal  of 
temporary workers.  
These reforms should continue while a new model for long-term growth 
should be found. Spain has good endowments to use, like excellent infrastructure 
and successful companies. Stronger export activity, international presence and 
innovation can be bases for such a durable growth.  
On  the  short  run,  the  extremely  high  unemployment  rate  is  a  major 
concern. The massive job-creating role of the construction and real-estate sectors 
has ended and cannot be soon substituted. In the spring of 2011 there were 1.38 54   Andrea ￉LTETŐ 
 
million Spanish families where each member was unemployed. The number of 
young  people  without  work  is  huge.  There are  signs  that  many  unemployed 
become discouraged and leave the labour market. Thus, in the following years it 
can be predicted that unemployment will be the most important problem of the 
Spanish economy. 
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